Imagery: Mental Pictures Disrupt Perceptual Rivalry  by Slotnick, Scott D.
ant host’s brood odour such that they
are carried to the ant’s nest where they
then predate ant brood [9]. Sensory
traps are common inmutualisms,whilst
cost-enforced honest signalling is
relatively rare, which contrasts with
theubiquity of honest signals employed
in mate selection and predator
deterrence [8]. Cost-enforced honest
signalling has only been demonstrated
in plant–pollinator systems. It may
be that partners in many mutualisms
have limited recourse to sanctions
that might punish bad behaviour by
their partners [8,10].
It is easy to see how the coercive,
dishonest signalling employed by
lepidopteranmutualists could switch to
greater exploitation and parasitism.
However, the honest by-product
mutualism between aphids and ants
also becomes exploitative when
environmental conditions change.
For example, when an alternative,
superior carbohydrate source is
made available ants prefer to
predate aphids rather than harvest
honeydew [11].
Morales et al. [6] have provided
a valuable insight into the role of
communication in mutualisms. Alarm
signalling by treehoppers clearly
increases the coordination of benefits
with ants, and this may be especially
important when high population
density means there is competition for
ant services. In contrast, the coercive
means employed by lepidopteran
caterpillars might improve their
prospects of receiving protection,
especially when they have inferior
rewards on offer compared to
constitutive honeydew producers. This
subtle analysis of differences in
interspecific interactions confirms
a key role for communication in
coordinating the investments partners
make in mutualisms.
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Figure 1. The ant Formica fusca collecting
honeydew from nymphs of the treehopper,
Publilia concava (photo courtesy of Manuel
Morales).
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R603Imagery: Mental Pictures Disrupt
Perceptual Rivalry
Are mental images like pictures? Yes, according to a new study showing that
imagery can have a high degree of visual specificity and thereby disrupt
perceptual rivalry.
Scott D. Slotnick
It has been debated for centuries
whether visual mental imagery is
pictorial or symbolic, like language
(Figure 1, left and center). A growing
body of neural evidence has recently
weighed into the debate, capitalizing
on the hierarchical nature of visual
cortical processing [1,2] where simple
visual features, such as line orientation,
are processed in posterior occipital
regions and increasingly abstract
information is processed later in the
occipital-temporal processing stream
(Figure 1, right). Specifically, there is
evidence suggesting imagery can be
pictorial as this mental process can
produce activity in early visual regions
[3] and has even been shown to evoke
activity with topographic organization
reflecting the precise stimulus location
in the visual field [4–6]. A sound
argument can be made, however, that
such activity does not reflect a core
aspect of the imagery per se, but is
rather epiphenomenal (like the noise
given off by a car engine). A recent
Current Biology paper by Pearson et al.
[7] reports that visual imagery can
disrupt binocular/perceptual rivalry.
This is themost compelling evidence to
date that imagery can be pictorial.
Binocular rivalry occurs when
a unique stimulus is presented to each
eye but only one stimulus is perceived
(dominant) at any given time, as if the
stimuli compete for access to
consciousness. In the Pearson et al.
study [7], green vertical gratings/lines
and red horizontal gratings/lines were
briefly presented to the left and right
eye, respectively, and then, after an
intervening period, the same patterns
were again briefly presented. For each
rivalry display, participants reported
the stimulus they perceived (vertical or
horizontal gratings). When participants
passively viewed the display, their
perception was quite stable across the
first and second presentation (80% of
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Figure 1. Visual imagery: pictorial or symbolic?
What would you experience if you studied the painting by van Gogh to the left (Cologne: Wallraf-Richartz Museum) and then imagined it? Some
believe the image can be pictorial, having a similar type of visual representation as the perceived painting (but with reduced intensity, as shown
in the upper center panel), while others argue that the image is represented symbolically (such as a verbal description, as shown in the lower
center panel). One way to distinguish between these hypotheses is to evaluate the predicted pattern of brain activity corresponding to the
known hierarchical organization of visual cortical processing. The simplest visual features (such as line orientation) are processed in the pos-
terior occipital cortex with progressively more abstract processing (object shape, category, and ultimately the verbal label/word) occurring later
in the occipital-temporal processing stream (neural regions associated with each type of processing are demarcated by ovals, with successive
stages connected by arrows). If imagery is pictorial, it should activate visual processing regions (as shown in the upper right panel, red shading),
while if imagery is symbolic is should activate word processing regions (and not visual processing regions, as shown in the lower right panel).
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R604the time the same stimulus was
dominant for both presentations,
where 50% corresponds to a chance
level of perceptual stability with an
equal probability of perceiving either
stimulus on the second presentation).
When participants imagined the
non-dominant stimulus during the
intervening period — for example,
a horizontal grating if a vertical grating
had been perceived during the first
presentation — it lowered perceptual
stability between the first and second
presentation to chance levels.
Pearson et al. [7] then assessed the
degree to which imagery might reflect
weak perception by presenting
a non-dominant stimulus in the
intervening period (rather than having
participants imagine it) and varying the
level of stimulus intensity. At 40%
intensity, the perceptual effects
mirrored the imagery effects (bringing
the perceptual stability to chance
levels, with a similar effect also
observed by reducing stimulus
contrast). Furthermore, systematically
increasing the temporal duration of
perception (at reduced intensity) orimagery of the non-dominant stimulus
during the intervening period
systematically reduced perceptual
stability. These results were very
similar for the perception and imagery
conditions, suggesting that imagery
can be pictorial and equivalent to a
perceptualstimulusat reduced intensity.
In a final experiment, Pearson et al.
[7] measured the degree to which these
effects corresponded to the specific
orientation that was perceived or
imagined. The protocol included just
two stimulus presentations (like the
passive viewing condition described
above). The first presentation was
either a green vertical grating or a red
horizontal grating in the perception
condition (at 40% intensity), or a cue to
imagine one or the other of these
stimuli in the imagery condition (keep
in mind that only one stimulus was
perceived or imagined in the first
presentation, so there was no rivalry).
The second presentation included the
rivalry pair as described previously
(referred to as 0 degree orientation
difference, as one of the stimuli had the
same grating orientation as the firstpresentation) in addition to rivalry pairs
with other orientations. Perceptual
stability between the first and second
presentations was used to
systematically measure orientation
effects. An orientation difference of
0 degrees resulted in a high degree of
perceptual stability (replicating the
passive viewing condition results
above), an orientation difference of
22.5 degrees produced less perceptual
stability, and a difference of 45 degrees
yielded chance levels of perceptual
stability. These effects were
remarkably similar for both perception
and imagery and provided further
evidence that imagery is akin to
perception with reduced intensity. Of
additional importance, these results
show that imagery can contain
orientation specific information which
limits the candidate neural regions that
might underlie these effects.
Only early visual regions — such
as V1, V2, V3, V4 or V8 — have a
topographic representation of space,
with neighboring regions of the visual
field mapped onto neighboring regions
of cortex [8–10]. Within these regions,
Microtubule Stabilization: Formins
Assert Their Independence
Mammalian Diaphanous-related (mDia) formins are well known for their actin
nucleation and filament elongation activities. They have since emerged as
microtubule-binding proteins, and a recent study shows that mDia2 stabilizes
microtubules independently of its actin nucleation activity.
Aaron D. DeWard
and Arthur S. Alberts
Side by side, microtubules and
filamentous actin (F-actin) work in
concert to facilitate essential
changes in cell morphology [1,2].
One mechanism governing actin
remodeling includes Rho GTP-binding
proteins signaling through mDia formin
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R605the visual representation can be
described as truly pictorial. Moreover,
only the first few visual regions (V1, V2
and V3) are orientation selective, with
sub-regions that process specific
stimulus orientations [11,12]. It is
therefore not surprising that binocular
rivalry studies that have used
orientation grating stimuli have
reported modulation of activity in these
orientation-selective regions [13,14].
It follows that the binocular rivalry
stimuli used in the new study by
Pearson et al. [7] also evoked activity in
these regions. When considered in
conjunction with the observed
orientation specific effects of imagery,
the evidence suggests the interactions
between imagery and perceptual rivalry
occurred within the earliest orientation
selective visual regions.
Evidence bearing on the depictive
nature of imagery can be broadly
classified as either correlational or
disruptive. Correlational evidence,
which is abundant, refers to imagery
effects that mirror perception and
includes behavioral findings — such
as shifting attention between objects
in an imagined visual scene takes
progressively longer as distance
increases, as if the image is being
scanned [15] — and neural findings
(mentioned previously). Such evidence
could be disregarded by symbolic
imagery theorists as epiphenomenal,
however, because it is possible that it
reflects mental operations that have
nothing to do with imagery — for
example, a mental simulation based on
knowledge that symbolic imagery
might follow known physical laws, such
as it takes longer to scan greater
distances [16].
Disruptive evidence refers to
interference of a given mental process
either by another process that shares
the same neural substrates or by direct
disruption of the underlying neural
substrates. Such evidence supporting
pictorial imagery is relatively sparse.
Behavioral work has shown imagined
vertical lines can impair performance
on a perceptual line discrimination task
[17], a patient’s imagined (and
perceived) visual field was restricted
following partial removal of occipital
cortex [18], and temporary cortical
deactivation of occipital cortex
impaired performance on a task
involving imagery of oriented lines [19].
This type of evidence is particularly
convincing because it shows visual
perceptual processing or visualprocessing regions are necessary
for imagery.
The new study by Pearson et al. [7]
provides a much needed contribution
to the category of disruptive
evidence. They showed that imagery
disrupted binocular rivalry in an
orientation-specific manner,
suggesting orientation processing in
early visual regions was necessary
for both perception and imagery. It
is notable that even if this evidence
was correlational, it would still be
impenetrable to a mental simulation
argument (as it would be nonsensical
to propose participants had any
knowledge of how rivalrous perceptual
stimuli and imagined stimuli might
interact). Considering these factors,
this evidence can be considered the
most compelling to date that imagery
can be pictorial.
References
1. Felleman, D.J., and Van Essen, D.C. (1991).
Distributed hierarchical processing in the
primate cerebral cortex. Cereb. Cortex 1, 1–47.
2. Slotnick, S.D. (2004). Visual memory and visual
perception recruit common neural substrates.
Behav. Cogn. Neurosci. Rev. 3, 207–221.
3. Kosslyn, S.M., Ganis, G., and Thompson, W.L.
(2001). Neural foundations of imagery. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 2, 635–642.
4. Kosslyn, S.M., Alpert, N.M., Thompson, W.L.,
Maljkovic, V., Weise, S.B., Chabris, C.F.,
Hamilton, S.E., Rauch, S.L., and Buonanno, F.S.
(1993). Visual mental imagery activates
topographically organized visual cortex: PET
investigations. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 5, 263–287.
5. Klein, I., Dubois, J., Mangin, J.F., Kherif, F.,
Flandin, G., Poline, J.B., Denis, M.,
Kosslyn, S.M., and Le Bihan, D. (2004).
Retinotopic organization of visual mental
images as revealed by functional magnetic
resonance imaging. Cogn. Brain Res. 22,
26–31.
6. Slotnick, S.D., Thompson, W.L., and
Kosslyn, S.M. (2005). Visual mental imagery
induces retinotopically organized activation of
early visual areas. Cereb. Cortex 15,
1570–1583.
7. Pearson, J., Clifford, C.W., and Tong, F.
(2008). The functional impact of mentalimagery on conscious perception. Curr. Biol.
18, 982–986.
8. Inouye, T. (1909). Die Sehstorungen bei
Schussverletzungen der kortikalen
Sehsphare nach Beobachtungen an
Verwundeten der letzten japanischen Kriege
(Leipzig: W. Engelmann).
9. Sereno, M.I., Dale, A.M., Reppas, J.B.,
Kwong, K.K., Belliveau, J.W., Brady, T.J.,
Rosen, B.R., and Tootell, R.B. (1995). Borders
of multiple visual areas in humans revealed by
functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Science 268, 889–893.
10. Slotnick, S.D., and Yantis, S. (2003). Efficient
acquisition of human retinotopic maps. Hum.
Brain Mapp. 18, 22–29.
11. Tootell, R.B.H., Hadjikhani, N.K., Vanduffel, W.,
Liu, A.K., Mendola, J.D., Sereno, M.I., and
Dale, A.M. (1998). Functional analysis of
primary visual cortex (V1) in humans. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 95, 811–817.
12. Vanduffel, W., Tootell, R.B.H., Schoups, A.A.,
and Orban, G.A. (2002). The organization of
orientation selectivity throughout macaque
visual cortex. Cereb. Cortex 12, 647–662.
13. Polonsky, A., Blake, R., Braun, J., and
Heeger, D.J. (2000). Neural activity in human
primary visual cortex correlates with perception
during binocular rivalry. Nat. Neurosci. 3,
1153–1159.
14. Tong, F., and Engel, S.A. (2001). Interocular
rivalry revealed in the human cortical blind-spot
representation. Nature 411, 195–199.
15. Kosslyn, S.M., Ball, T.M., and Reiser, B.J.
(1978). Visual images preserve metric spatial
information: evidence from studies of image
scanning. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 4, 47–60.
16. Pylyshyn, Z.W. (2002). Mental imagery: in
search of a theory. Behav. Brain Sci. 25,
157–182.
17. Craver-Lemley, C., and Reeves, A. (1992). How
visual imagery interferes with vision. Psychol.
Rev. 99, 633–649.
18. Farah, M.J., Soso, M.J., and Dasheiff, R.M.
(1992). Visual angle of themind’s eye before and
after unilateral occipital lobectomy. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 18, 241–246.
19. Kosslyn, S.M., Pascual-Leone, A., Felician, O.,
Camposano, S., Keenan, J.P., Thompson, W.L.,
Ganis, G., Sukel, K.E., and Alpert, N.M. (1999).
The role of area 17 in visual imagery:
convergent evidence from PET and rTMS.
Science 284, 167–170.
Psychology Department, Boston College,
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02467, USA.
E-mail: sd.slotnick@bc.edu
DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2008.06.002
